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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. ZONING DECISIONS HELD TO "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" STANDARD
OF REvIEw
The Fasano doctrine's1 brief but convoluted course through
South Carolina law came to a halt in Hampton v. Richland
County,2 in which the supreme court dismissed, as improvi-
dently granted, a writ of certiorari to review an opinion by the
court of appeals.3 The supreme court characterized all discussion
of Fasano in the court of appeals' opinion as merely dicta.4 By
dismissing certiorari, however, the court effectively may have re-
jected the doctrine.
The Fasano doctrine arose after years of increasing skepti-
cism among judges and legal scholars that local zoning bodies
make land use decisions fairly, impartially, and with a proper
concern for effects on the totality of any general zoning plan. In
particular, critics objected to rezoning ordinances in which a lo-
cal zoning board would settle a dispute between quarreling fac-
tions over a single parcel of land. Such rezonings traditionally
have been considered legislative acts, therefore presumptively
1. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), over-
ruled in part, Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 155, 603 P.2d 771 (1979), reh'g
denied, 288 Or. 585, 607 P.2d 722 (1980).
2. - S.C. -, 370 S.E.2d 714 (1988).
3. Hampton v. Richland County, 292 S.C. 500, 357 S.E.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1987).
4. - S.C. at - , 370 S.E.2d at 714.
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valid. Under the Fasano doctrine such ordinances are character-
ized as "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" acts, subject, therefore, to a
stricter standard of judicial review.'
The disputed property in Hampton was an undeveloped hill
outside the Columbia city limits. Its owner, Hampton, con-
tracted to sell the land to the Krystal Company, which wished to
build a fast food restaurant on the site. A neighborhood group
opposed these plans. The Richland County Council (Council)
settled the dispute by rezoning the property from D-1 (develop-
ment district) to C-1 (office and institutional), a classification
under which restaurants are not allowed. The circuit court up-
held Council's decision.'
In 1986 the court of appeals reversed. The court followed
the Fasano approach in holding Council's action to be quasi-ju-
dicial in nature. Thus stripped of any presumption of legislative
validity, Council's decision was considered not fairly debatable
but clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious.7
On rehearing the next year, however, the court reversed it-
self. Two principal concerns now caused the court to flatly reject
Fasano:
1) a quasi-judicial approach would over-burden courts
with "countless challenges"; and
2) the authority of a zoning board's action would be de-
based so that every affected property owner could challenge it
on entirely selfish motives; the result would be the destruction
of "both the necessity and desirability of representative legisla-
tive action as well as [the reduction of] land use determination
to a type of 'what's-in-it-for-me' or spot zoning scheme."8
Judge Gardner, who had authored the original opinion, dis-
sented, basing his position on the following dictum quoted in
Rushing v. City of Greenville:' "[I]n the final analysis the ques-
5. See Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Legal Legitimacy, 71 CALiF. L. REv. 839 (1983).
6. 292 S.C. at 503, 357 S.E.2d at 464.
7. Hampton v. Richland County, No. 0785, slip op. 33 (S.C. Aug. 25, 1986). This
opinion is appendixed to the published opinion listed on rehearing. 292 S.C. at 509, 357
S.E.2d at 468.
8. 292 S.C. at 507, 357 S.E.2d at 467 (quoting Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kent-
wood, 406 Mich. 137, 163, 277 N.W.2d 475, 481-82 (1979)).
9. 265 S.C. 285, 217 S.E.2d 797 (1975).
[Vol. 40
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tion of due process is a judicial, not legislative, one."1 Judge
Gardner viewed this language as an expansion of the "fairly de-
batable" standard of review to permit stricter scrutiny of the re-
zoning of single tracts of land.11
The conflict within the court of appeals, therefore, was not
merely one over acceptance or rejection of Fasano; the more ba-
sic issue was the proper application of the "fairly debatable"
standard of review in regard to rezonings of single tracts of land.
Based on its construction of the Rushing dictum, the dissent re-
viewed Council's action pursuant to a complex set of eight fac-
tors. 2 The majority rejected such a strict analysis, however, rea-
soning that the fairly debatable standard, itself, is premised on a
presumption of validity as to municipal rezoning.13
By dismissing certiorari the supreme court effectively up-
held the court of appeals' majority view of the fairly debatable
standard. Such a view is incompatible with the Fasano doctrine.
Despite its characterizing all discussion of Fasano by the court
of appeals as dicta, the supreme court appears to have laid to
rest the doctrine in South Carolina.
Daniel J. Westbrook
II. ZONING BOARD MAY RECONSIDER PREVIOUSLY RENDERED
DECISIONS
In Bennett v. City of Clemson14 the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that the Board of Adjustment of the city of
Clemson invalidly approved Wyant Associates' (Wyant) request
for a variance to construct a multifamily development in Clem-
son. Despite determining that the board acted lawfully in recon-
sidering Wyant's request, the court found that the approval
10. Id. at 289, 217 S.E.2d at 799 (quoting James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565,
585, 88 S.E.2d 661, 671 (1955)).
11. 292 S.C. at 514, 357 S.E.2d at 471. A decision is not fairly debatable when it is
"so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional rights." Rushing v. City of
Greenville, 265 S.C. at 288, 217 S.E.2d at 799 (quoting Rush v. City of Greenville, 246
S.C. 268, 276, 143 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1965)).
12. 292 S.C. at 514 n.1, 357 S.E.2d at 471 n.1.
13. Id. at 503, 357 S.E.2d at 465 ("[T]he action of a municipality regarding the
rezoning of property will not be overturned by a court if the municipality's decision is
'fairly debatable.' This is because the municipality's action is presumed to have been
validly exercised .... ).
14. 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987).
1988]
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lacked the requisite four votes in favor of the variance. Bennett
offers guidance for practitioners in the law of land use develop-
ment by discussing two previously unaddressed issues.
On October 8, 1984, Wyant proposed a 324-unit housing de-
velopment to the Clemson Planning Commission. The Commis-
sion denied the request, however, because the number of units
contained in Wyant's proposal exceeded the maximum density
limit in the area when combined with the units already in exis-
tence.' On November 5, 1984, the Clemson City Council low-
ered the maximum density figure." Subsequently, Wyant sub-
mitted a new proposal that satisfied the 1971 density
requirement but failed the stricter standard imposed by the
1984 ordinance. The Planning Commission, using the 1971 ordi-
nance, approved Wyant's plan and recommended it to the Board
of Adjustment.' 7 On June 13, 1985, the Board of Adjustment de-
nied Wyant's request for zoning approval, but after reconsidera-
tion and with the addition of two new members,' the Board
subsequently approved the development.'9
The supreme court first determined that the Board of Ad-
justment acted lawfully in reconsidering its June 13, 1985, deci-
sion. The courts of South Carolina had not previously discussed
a zoning board's power to reconsider a matter once it rendered a
decision.20 By granting zoning boards such authority, however,
the Bennett court adopts the approach employed in what ap-
pears to be a slight majority of jurisdictions.2
In reaching this decision, the supreme court first considered
15. Id. at 65, 358 S.E.2d at 708.
16. Record at 33.
17. 293 S.C. at 65, 358 S.E.2d at 708.
18. On May 13, 1985, the Clemson City Council amended the zoning ordinance to
increase the membership of the Board of Adjustment from five to seven members. The
new members were added on June 24, 1985. Record at 34.
19. 293 S.C. at 66, 358 S.E.2d at 708.
20. Id. The issue has been addressed in a number of other jurisdictions. Many
states allow reconsideration if new facts are alleged or circumstances substantially
change. See, eg., Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976); Wright v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 174 Conn. 488, 391 A.2d 146 (1978); Braughton v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zon-
ing Appeals, 146 Ind. App. 652, 257 N.E.2d 839 (1970); Wolfe v. Forbes, 159 W. Va. 34,
217 S.E.2d 899 (1975). Other states, however, prohibit reconsideration when not ex-
pressly authorized by statute. See, e.g., Kethman v. Oceola Township, 88 Mich. App. 94,
276 N.W.2d 529 (1979). Cf. Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Servs., 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa
1979) (agency's unemployment compensation decision not reviewable).
21. See cases cited supra note 20.
[Vol. 40
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the legislation discussing the powers of the Board of Adjust-
ment. Neither the state enabling statutes22 nor the city zoning
ordinances 23 address the Board of Adjustment's power to recon-
sider a matter previously decided. The court determined that
the absence of a legislative prohibition against reconsideration
indicated the Board had not exceeded its lawful authority by re-
considering Wyant's proposal.2 4
The court recognized the potential uncertainty created by
allowing the board to reconsider prior decisions. 25 The court rec-
ommended reconsideration only in the event of "justification
and good cause. '28 Further, the court found two justifications for
the reconsideration: (1) both Wyant, the architect, and the at-
torney most familiar with the project were absent from the hear-
ing, and (2) there was a need for additional information.
7
Therefore, it held that under the circumstances the Board of
Adjustment did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its ear-
lier decision.
Next the court examined the validity of the Board's ap-
proval of Wyant's proposal. The court decided that the recently
enacted 1984 ordinance, rather than the 1971 ordinance, applied
22. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-7-710 to -830 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987).
23. See CLEMSON, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCES art. XVI, §§ 1603 to -05 (1971); art. IX
§ 914 (1984).
24. The appellants, landowners in the neighborhood where Wyant proposed to de-
velop, argued the lack of direct regulatory authorization prevented the Board from re-
considering the matter. In support of the proposition, appellants cited Bostic v. City of
West Columbia, 268 S.C. 386, 324 S.E.2d 224 (1977), and Piedmont & N. Ry. v. Scott,
202 S.C. 207, 24 S.E.2d 353 (1943). The respondent, however, distinguished those cases
pointing out that they involved regulatory decisions explicitly contradicting state legisla-
tion. Brief of Respondent at 5-6.
25. 293 S.C. 64, 66, 358 S.E.2d 707, 708. In support of arguments to this effect, the
court cited Crawford v. Town of Winnsboro, 205 S.C. 72, 30 S.E.2d 841 (1944), and Miles
v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938). Decisions from other jurisdictions also
support this proposition. See, e.g., Andreatta v. Kuhlman, 43 Colo. App. 200, 600 P.2d
119 (1979); Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 412 A.2d 1024 (1980). Respondent,
arguing that Crawford was distinguishable from the case at bar, claimed that the subject
matter in Crawford, workers' compensation decisions, is a much more precise field than
the amorphous law of land use development. Brief of Respondent at 7-9.
26. 293 S.C. at 66-67, 358 S.E. 2d at 709. The court also indicated that "newly
discovered evidence, fraud, surprise, mistake, inadvertence, or change in conditions
would satisfy this requirement." Id. at 67, 358 S.E.2d at 709.
27. Respondent explained that the additional information included a buffer area to
protect adjacent landowners, university student occupancy, a $1,000 developer's impact
fee, construction code compliance, and regulation of design and occupancy. Record at 20,
22, 25, and 28.
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in the board's reconsideration. 8 In so doing, it relied on the
well-settled principle that statutory enactments are applied ret-
roactively only if remedial or procedural in nature.2 The court
classified the 1984 voting regulations as procedural and conse-
quently applied the 1984 ordinance retroactively.
Finally, the court found the Board's approval invalid under
the 1984 ordinance. The approval was supported by four votes,
one cast in absentia. The court noted the lack of authorization
for absentee voting from both the Clemson ordinances and state
enabling statutes.30 It also explained that the Clemson zoning
ordinance implicitly required the presence of all four supporters
of a zoning request.31 Finally, the court found persuasive an Ala-
bama decision construing a similar statute requiring all concur-
ring votes be cast while board members are present. 2 Accord-
ingly, the court held that Wyant's request was not approved by
the requisite four votes and reversed the trial court's affirmation
of the Board of Adjustment's decision.
In the narrowest sense, the supreme court in Bennett held
28. 293 S.C. at 67, 358 S.E.2d at 709. Both parties argued on the applicability of
the 1984 ordinance, but the importance of this issue should not be overlooked. As the
appellant pointed out, if the two newly-appointed members can participate but no ab-
sentee voting is permitted, Wyant's request would be denied under the 1984 ordinance
but pass under the 1971 ordinance. Brief of Appellant at 10-11.
29. In South Carolina, statutory application is presumed to be prospective absent
clear legislative intent to the contrary. See Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 F.2d 291
(4th Cir. 1946); Oehler v. Clinton, 282 S.C. 25, 317 S.E.2d 445 (1984); Hyder v. Jones, 271
S.C. 85, 245 S.E.2d 123 (1978); Pulliam v. Doe, 246 S.C. 106, 142 S.E.2d 861 (1965);
Carolina Chemicals, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Environmental Control,
290 S.C. 498, 351 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1986). The principal exception to the general rule
is that remedial or procedural statutes are to operate retroactively. Segars v. Gomez, 360
F. Supp. 50 (D.S.C. 1972); Merchants Mut. Ins. v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund,
277 S.C. 604, 291 S.E.2d 667 (1982).
30. Respondent argued the absence of direct legislation effects the opposite result.
Respondent asserted that the proper question in such a situation was whether an absen-
tee vote by one of the members who had voted in the initial hearing, who therefore was
familiar with the case, was a reasonable exercise of the broad procedural powers granted
to local boards of adjustment by S.C. CODE. ANN. § 6-7-740 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1987). Brief of Respondent at 24-27.
31. The applicable ordinance provides: "The Board shall keep minutes of its pro-
ceedings, showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to
vote, indicating such fact." CLEMSON, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCES, art. IX, § 911 (1984)(em-
phasis added). The court explained that by linking "if absent or failing to vote" so
closely together, the ordinance contemplated the requisite four votes to be cast by mem-
bers who were present.
32. Moore v. Pettus, 260 Ala. 616, 71 So. 2d 814 (1954).
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that the Clemson zoning ordinance precludes absentee voting by
members of the Board of Adjustment. Practitioners should real-
ize, however, that the real significance of the decision may lie in
the court's authorization of zoning boards to reconsider matters
previously decided.
A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr.
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